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This research aims to answer the question Did the ZON/Optimus merger added value to the 
shareholders? Through a quantitative analysis, using data from Bloomberg, companies’ reports 
and newspapers, a wide range of stock analysis, financial ratios, estimations and comparisons 
were performed. This study indicates that the merger was successful for the shareholders so far, 
the company has become stronger, more powerful in the Portuguese market and presents signals 
of financial sustainability in the long term. There is proved evidence that the merger added 
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Introduction, methodology and method 
 
ZON and Optimus announced in December 2012 the merger of their operations, which was the 
largest one in this decade in Portugal.  The strategic question of the dissertation has the objective 
of researching the added value to the shareholders of the merged company NOS from the 
merger of ZON and Optimus. The methodology adopted will be quantitative, and the method 
will be the analysis of public available data (e.g. Bloomberg, annual reports, Euronext). The 
empirical research encompasses 2 sections: the first based on the post-merger NOS market 
performance, encompassing namely the stock development and performance, volatility. While 
the second part, will be a brief equity research to analyze performance over time, including pre-
merged companies, stock performance sustainability, dividends and the ratings. Part of the 
research will also include the analysis of the merger, both in the national and international 





Harper (1997) and Lehn (2002) confirmed that the telecom sector is one of the most affected 
by oligopolization. According to Graham and Marvin (1996), the telecom sector relies heavily 
on the economies of scale and minimal international competition, as the governmental 
regulation keeps protecting the domestic companies. According to Weston et al (2004), mergers 
and acquisitions are the least-cost responsive to the deregulation inside the telecommunications 
industry and to technological change.  
Rosenbaum and Pearl (2013) state that the synergies are the primary value enhancers for M&A 
deals, especially when targeting companies with the same core business. The principle of 2 plus 
2 equals five is in the origin of every merger. The timing and success on delivering expected 
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synergies are decisive factors for the success of the merger which is reflected on the share price 
movement. 
Lebraud and Karlströmer (2001) conducted an analysis of the mergers and acquisitions in the 
telecom industry, confirming that it has been a very relevant strategy for many years in the 
sector. According to Farrel (2016), M&A deals in telecom, media and technology are increasing 
over time, having reached an all-time high in 2015 with transactions valued at 768,3 billion 
dollars. That is one of the reasons why the sector is so competitive today. According to this 
research, the motivations for M&A in the Telecom industry have evolved over time. The 
conclusion achieved in the analysis is that the majority of the deals occur between firms who 
share the core business and within their domestic market. 
Lebraud and Karlströmer also concluded that the future of M&A in Telecom will be determined 
by the gain of “scale benefits, and whether they can achieve these on a cross-border basis”, “the 
amount of in-country consolidation that regulators will allow” and the “operator decisions to 
expand aggressively in non-core areas”.  
Kumar (2012) states that until the late 1990s the most common strategy among huge firms were 
the strategic alliances, however, with the deregulation of the industry cross-border, M&A 
became the most preferred solution.  
According to Ward (2003), there are five reasons for mergers and acquisitions in the 
telecommunications industry. Theses major forces are the globalization phenomenon, the 
deregulation, technological change caused by the digital revolution, the search for scale and 
scope economies as well as the advantages offered under corporate tax laws. On the other hand, 
Koi-Akrofi (2014) states that the main reasons for M&A activity in the telecommunications 
industry are the synergies, growth, market standing improvement, wealth creating for 
shareholders and empire building. A McKinsey report (2001) states that in domestic 
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acquisitions in telecom, each single percentage point increase in market share can add 0,5 
percent to a telecommunication’s firm EBITDA. 
In what dividends in the telecom industry are concerned, Blundell-Wignall and Roulet (2013) 
stated that “companies in low-growth sectors with a high earnings yield (low price to earnings) 
such as (...) telecommunications (...) pay higher dividends” than high growth companies (with 
high price to earnings ratio). 
Verma and Sharma (2014), conducted an analysis of M&A impact in Indian Telecom firms on 
their long term performance. Their conclusion was that M&A in this industry, on average, did 
not “improve shareholder funds of the acquiring firm; rather, it actually decreases them”. In 
spite of having levered the synergies between the two firms, “they haven’t been able to improve 
their financial and operational performance”. Another conclusion was that in Telecom, most of 
the mergers do not aim at “maximizing profits and henceforth, the wealth of shareholders. The 
decisions for M&A may have been inspired by the intention of empire building, market 
consolidation or acquiring bigger size.” The major obstacles to M&A success are, for Charman 
(1999), the inability to sustain financial performance, loss of productivity, incompatible 
cultures, loss of key talent and clash of management styles. Dixon and Nelson (2005) also stated 
the following: “three of the five obstacles listed above fall squarely within the human resource 
arena.” 
Bouwman et al (2003) agree that the acquiring firms are losers in the long-run, however, “this 
underperformance has been attributed to the smallest acquirers”. Related to that comes Girma’s 
finding (2008) that post-acquisition security prices are higher for larger firms. While hostile 
offers create value for bidders, mergers do not. On top of that, “diversification tends to destroy 
value, whereas focus conserves it”. Kemal (2011) conducted an experiment of the impact of a 
merger in twenty financial ratios concluding that the overall impact was negative. Of course, 
there is no consensus in this subject and an evidence of that are the conclusions of a similar 
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study by Altunbas and Ybañez (2004) that proved that there were improvements on the merging 
firms’ financial ratios. Hu (2009) found mixed financial results after the merger concluding 
only that the industry and year of transaction are determinant factors of the success of a deal. 
Mantravadi and Reddy (2008) examined the profitability of acquiring firms and conclusively 
registering an increase. 
Kotzen et al (2003) conducted a study that indicates “that acquisitions that take place during 
periods with below-average economic growth create more shareholder value than strong-
economy acquisitions.” In contrast, Rosen (2006) found evidence that when a market reacts 
positively to a merger announcement, the tendency is to continue to do so, and also that 
announcements on hot stock markets tend to have a better reaction.  Bruner (2004) added that 
two-thirds of the mergers analyzed, with only one bidder, had a positive result. 
On the other hand, Yen and Andre (2010) disagree stating that the acquiring firms’ shareholders 
could expect at maximum a break even, when loss is the most likely scenario.  
To sum up, M&A deals have been very relevant inside the telecom industry. There is no general 
opinion on the success of this strategy as there are different factors that determine the success 
of each case which has to be analyzed individually. The success of a merger can be measured 
by comparing financial ratios, the profits and the stock performance. 
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Research Method, data collection and sample 
 
 
This section summarizes the data collection, the sample selection, and the method of analysis 
adopted in the research. 
Data collection: All daily stock last price data was collected from Bloomberg. This data was 
used to calculate the percentage change of the stock price during that period by comparing the 
last value with the first and was also calculated the volatility by computing the standard 
deviation of the daily changes of stock prices. Since the merger resulted in an incorporation of 
Optimus in ZON, NOS SGPS stock price was used as a reference, Sonaecom (former major 
shareholder of Optimus) has a stake of NOS but it reflects a smaller part of its operations. All 
the quantitative data was collected from companies’ websites and newspaper articles. 
For the equity analysis of ZON, since it was listed in the Stock Market, all the yearly financial 
results information is available online. On the other hand, Optimus was not listed, so the only 
information available is the one inside Sonaecom’s reports, which does not include profits from 
Optimus, only revenues, costs and EBITDA. As there is little information about Optimus 
financial performance, a proportion was made between the company and Sonaecom in order to 
have an approximate value for each of the values of the income statement and statement of 
financial position. According to Fernández (2006), “a company’s profit after tax is quite an 
arbitrary figure, obtained after assuming certain accounting hypotheses regarding expenses and 
revenues. On the other hand, its cash flow is an objective measure, a single figure that is not 
subject to any personal criterion”. The research will focus on the analysis of the net income, 
and particularly on the free cash flow generated by the new merged company. 
Sample selection: To compare NOS stock performance six different bundles of stocks where 
selected. The first is the Portuguese Index, PSI 20 and the second includes all the Portuguese 
listed companies that were traded since the merger was announced until now. The third includes 
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the fifty closest firms to NOS by market capitalization, in the Media Industry, according to 
Bloomberg. The fourth involves the fifty biggest telecom companies, by market capitalization, 
also according to Bloomberg. Then, one that includes the major listed NOS shareholders, as of 
24 March 2016. The last one includes twenty different companies in different time periods, 
after a merger or acquisition between two strong players in the market. The biggest in terms of 
market capacity from those that resulted on a firm that is still listed were chosen. All stock price 
data for this quantitative analysis was collected from Bloomberg. 
Method of analysis: To eliminate the ‘speculation effect’ on the post-announcement of the 
merger on the stock prices, a two-month period of abnormal returns was stipulated based on 
Bessembinder and Zhang conclusion in their paper Overreaction to Merger and Acquisition 
Announcements (2015). For this reason, in all the stock bundles analyzed, the first two months 
after the M&A announcement were ignored. For consistency purposes, the time period under 
study was the same for every stock, the same as the period between two months after NOS 
merger announcement (14 February, 2013) and the 24 March, 2016, corresponding to three 
years, 1 month and ten days. For the past merger and acquisitions newspapers and companies’ 
institutional websites were used for finding the official announcement date. 
For the financial statement analysis and trend creation for the pre-merger companies, data from 
the companies’ yearly financial report was collected and a five-year period was analyzed. 
However, for the stock price analysis, only data from the four-year period before the merger 
announcement was used. If one additional year had been included, the effects of Sonaecom 
takeover attempt over Portugal Telecom would be reflected. These effects, generated huge 
speculation on the stock market but had little effect on company activity. Financial multiples 




Stock performance analysis 
 
The merger by incorporation of Optimus in ZON, firstly creating ZON-Optimus was launched 
in the stock market right after the merger conclusion, on August 2013, increasing the equity by 
66% and the number of outstanding shares by 206.064.552 (CMVM, 2013). On May of the 
next year, the official name was changed to NOS. ZON was the 8th biggest company in the PSI 
20 before the merger and now is the 6th. 
As Hogan & Overmyer-Day stated (1994), there appears to be a developing consensus that 
M&A performance should be based on performance over a two-year period. ZON-Optimus 
merger was approved on August 2013 and on the beginning of March of 2016 the results of the 
second year of the new firm, NOS, were announced, so it is now possible to perform a financial 
analysis of the firm and understand how successful the merger was. 
The stock price movement is an indicator of how the markets assess the current value of the 
firm, it is correlated with financial crisis, wars, and with the application of strategies by the 
companies in the industry. With the information on the stock price change it is possible to say 
how the market reacted to a merger, in the short run, and that will be what the first part of the 
research consists on. 
For the stock performance analysis, a research was performed on the evolution of the last daily 
prices of the stocks of NOS (ZON Multimedia and PT Multimedia previously), until the 24 
March, three weeks after the announcement of the 2015 results, when NOS stocks were traded 
at 5,88€. 
According to Bessembinder and Zhang (2015), there is a significant overreaction to merger and 
acquisition announcements on the first two months after the official announcement. The two 
professors studied the Cumulative Abnormal returns, concluding that they were negative (-
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3,5%) on the two months following the merger or acquisition announcement in the top 10% 
speculative stocks. 
This study was made with an analysis of the “returns to target firm shareholders in the months 
following announcements of potential acquisitions of publicly traded firms” for “6,413 mergers 
and acquisitions announced between 1980 and 2012.” 
In the case of NOS, on the two months after the announcement, the stock price increased 24,3%. 
This performance was caused to a certain extent the by speculation on the merger so two 
different periods of analysis will be considered for the NOS stock price analysis. 
The first period are the four years prior to the announcement, the typical five-year period 
analysis will not be used due to the fact that the effects of the Sonaecom takeover attempt over 
Portugal Telecom on the ZON stock price still existed in the end of 2007 (PT Multimedia was 
spun of from Portugal Telecom as a measure to prevent the takeover). The second period 
englobes the first day after two months of the merger announcement, the 14 February 2013 until 
the 24 March 2016. On the following table the stock price change and volatility during the two 
periods is presented. 
 
Table 1 - Stock Change before and after the merger 
Period Stock Price % Change Stock Volatility 
14/12/2008 – 14/12/2012 -5,89% 0,019421 
14/02/2013 – 24/03/2016 82,48% 0,017559 
(Source: Bloomberg) 
 
At a first look, the merger appears to have had a positive result for NOS shareholders. While in 
the last 4 years of ZON the stock price decreased by almost 6%, the merger brought an increase 
of more than 82%, later on this research a conclusion will be determined on the reflection of 
whether this price change is added value to the investors or not. On top of that, the volatility 
also decreased after the merger which means that the stock is now more attractive to risk averse 
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investors. However, it is relevant to compare the performance of NOS stocks with other 
environments (indexes and stocks), as most of the shareholders are international institutions 
with whom the Portuguese listed stocks compete along with other companies from all over the 
world. For this reason, another 6 indexes and stocks were also researched for analysis. The time 
series is within the same time range, the 14 February 2013–24 March 2016 (37 months). The 
following table includes all the comparisons and later explains why they were chosen as well 
as what can be concluded. 
 
Table 2 - Stock Change in other Index and Stocks 
Stock/Index Stock Price % Change Stock Volatility 
NOS 82,48% 0,01756 
PSI 20 -17,37% 0,01398 
PSI 14 33,33% 0,02218 
Closest 50 by Market Cap 125,80% 0,02463 
Top 50 by Market Cap 72,39% 0,01650 
20 M&A 3,04% 0,02356 
NOS Shareholders 12,09% 0,01651 
(Source: Bloomberg) 
 
NOS main competitors are Vodafone, a global firm listed in London, and Portugal Telecom 
which was divided last year. The MEO Communications was sold to the French group Altice 
and PT segment that owned the participations in Rio Forte and Oni being listed as Pharol. As 
the impact of the Portuguese operations are not relevant for the performance of Vodafone and 
Altice stocks, it is impossible to compare NOS stock performance with its competitors’. 
 
The first comparison is to determine whether the stock, disregarding its increase, over 
performed the domestic market, the PSI 20. Despite the smaller volatility of the PSI 20 Index, 
which according to the laws of the statistics was expected given that a bigger number of samples 
means a smaller standard deviation, the stock value change was much bigger in NOS than in 
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the Portuguese Index, which on top of that was negative. NOS was overall, a good stock to 
invest in Portugal since the returns were substantially higher than the average (which was 
negative). For the period in analysis it was the 3rd top performing stock in the PSI 20 after Altri 
and Semapa. 
 
Since the announcement of the merger, the PSI 20 suffered changes, some companies were 
removed and others were added. An interesting analysis would be to compare NOS stock price 
with those that remained in the Index during the whole period in analysis, which includes 14 
companies, forming the “PSI 14”. As these Index does not include bankruptcy firms such as 
BES and Banif, the expected returns are higher than the returns from PSI 20. In spite of the 
latter NOS managed to over perform this Index even with a lower volatility. 
Since NOS was the 3rd best performing stock of the period in analysis, this result was expected, 
as the typical exiting firm from the stock market is a bad performing one. In conclusion, on a 
national basis, the ZON-Optimus Merger was positive for the ZON/NOS shareholders, granting 
much higher returns than the average stock in PSI 20.  
 
Regarding international companies, the first comparison will be with the Industry 50 closest 
companies by market capitalization. From these 50 companies [Bloomberg] six were taken 
out because they were not listed yet on the beginning of the period in analysis. Due to the fact 
that the Portuguese market is smaller and better established than the ones in scope, some of 
those 50 companies are still growing, and are not established as NOS is, so their stock price 
growth cannot be compared the NOS which only competes on a consolidated 10 million market. 
As expected, and due to the high amount of Asian emerging countries’ companies, the stock 
increase was much higher than NOS’ and so was the volatility, as growing companies’ stocks 
are more vulnerable to idiosyncratic effects. For this reason, the performance of the 50 biggest 
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telecom companies in the world, which are already established in their markets, will be added 
to this analysis. There is evidence that NOS outperformed the latter group, despite the higher 
volatility.  
 
To continue the stock performance analysis, the stock price change for 20 companies involved 
in mergers and acquisitions was analyzed. These mergers and acquisitions occurred in 
Europe, America and Asia and all of them involved close competitors. Cases like this were 
chosen specifically in order to maximize the similarity with NOS. 
Findings from Stunda (2014) suggest that for merging companies, the 2009-2012 period 
presents a significantly negative stock price effect when compared to the 2004-2007 period. 
From the 20 mergers analyzed, 4 occurred on that period. If the 2008 financial crisis and its 
impact on the stock market is considerer, 4 other mergers were affected. If the 2000-2003 
breakdown in S&P 500, CAC 40, FTSE 100 and DAX 30 is also considered, 8 other mergers 
were affected. For this reason, it is not possible to reach a conclusion and there is no valid 
interpretation for the result presented (3,044%). 
 
Finally, the last comparison will be between NOS and its main shareholders. The aim of this 
part of the research is to understand if an investment in NOS would be more profitable than an 
investment in the own company. The point is to justify whether the investment in NOS was 
profitable for the shareholders of NOS’ shareholders. To do so the change in stock price of 
some of NOS largest shareholders was computed. Since they increased an average of 12,09%, 
which is far below than NOS performance, it appears to have been an advantageous investment. 
In that sense, for instance a BPI or a Sonaecom shareholder does not have motives to question 
the investment in NOS stocks. 
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The time period analyzed ended on the 24 March 2016, however, the conclusion still holds until 
the present as the value of NOS has increased since then, being traded at 6.51€ as of 20 May 
2016, corresponding to a total increase of 102% since the beginning of the research period. 
Considering that on the first day of ZON-Optimus, approximately 513,5 million stocks were 
traded at 3,9623. This current value corresponds to an increase in the market capitalization of 
around 1200€ million. 
The NOS merger could be viewed as a success in the short-run, based on the stock performance, 
but assessing the success on the long run requires a deeper analysis of the change in the financial 
indicators and in the statement of financial position, to understand whether the short-run success 
is or is not sustainable and if the merger will continue to add value.  
 
Long term analysis  
 
 
After analyzing the impact of the merger on the shareholders it is time to analyze it in the 
company performance, to understand whether the good performance in the stock market is still 
based on speculation or if the company presents a sustainable growth and better financial health, 
which means that the success of the merger will be sustainable on the long run. DePamphilis 
(2014) states that examining post-merger accounting and other performance measures on the 
three to five years prior to the merger are relevant to determine how performance changed. 
The information available on ZON’s yearly reports can be used to compute the average growth 
rate on the five years prior to the merger (2008-2012) of several indicators of the statement of 
financial position and income statement. This average is then used to estimate the values that 
ZON would present if the merger did not occur for the years after the merger (2013-2015). In 
some reports, the information was different from the previous one due to alterations in the 
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accounting method, in that case, the most recent information was prioritized and past 
information was adjusted to it. 
As Optimus was not listed in the stock market, the information available of the firm is not 
sufficient to perform a financial analysis. On the other hand, Sonaecom was listed until the end 
of February 2016, before the takeover on the not owned equity. Optimus financial information 
can be estimated based on information from Sonaecom. 
A proportion between the revenues of Soanaecom group and Optimus revenues that are 
announced on group financial reports was estimated and then an average of this proportion 
across the five years before the merger was computed. 
 
Table 3 - Sonaecom/ Optimus Sales Proportion 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
SNC Rev. 986,7 956,4 928,9 872,4 834,7 
Opt. Rev. 971,2 890,9 865,6 824,3 780,6 
Proportion 98,43% 93,15% 93,19% 94,49% 93,49% 
Values in Thousands of Euros. 
(Source: NOS and Sonaecom financial reports) 
 
The five-year average is 94,55%, so from now on will be assumed that 94,55% of Sonaecom 
indicators represent Optimus stake on the firm. A similar proportion was computed with the 
EBITDA of the company and the group reaching a percentage of 98%. Based on Optimus’ 
yearly reports, an estimation for the Revenues, EBITDA and CAPEX growth was performed 
for the next three years. Then, an estimate of the Net Income and FCF for the 2013-2015 period 
was also performed. Using an average of the proportions calculated previously, it was reached 
a possible value of Optimus Net Income and FCF estimates. Finally, those values were added 
to ZON estimations and compared to the reality, the post merger company performance over 
the last three years. Although Optimus’ operations may represent around 94,55% of Sonaecom 
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operations, the presence of Optimus in the statement of financial position is not so influential. 
The average value of the assets, liabilities and equity of Sonaecom before the merger is 1938,76, 
947,28 and 991,5 respectively. While after the merger the values were the following: 1136,73, 
76,60 and 1060,17, for assets, liabilities and equity. Based on these values one can estimate the 
percentage of each one of these that represents Optimus, adjusting the equity value so that its 
sum with the liabilities equals assets. An estimation for the 2013-2015 period was also 
conducted and then the Optimus percentage stake was applied for the value of the Total Assets 
and Liabilities. The Equity is the difference of the other two indicators. The computed values 
are presented on the following table. 
 
Table 4 - ZON and Optimus estimations 
  Rev. EBITDA CAPEX FCF NI Assets Liab. Equity 
NOS 1444,3 533,1 408,3 37,5 82,7 2976,5 1913 1063,5 
ZON 937,31 381,09,9 115,44 76,63 38,93 1888,8 1646,6 242,2 
Optimus 662,75 338,9 105,16 -29,73 182,35 776,83 639,13 129,7 
Z+O 1600,1 719,9 220,6 49,9 221,3 2665,6 2285,73 371,9 
Values in Thousands of Euros 
(Source: NOS and Sonaecom financial reports) 
 
The table does not show evidence of financial growth. Although the ratio between assets and 
liabilities got better, the revenues, EBITDA, FCF and Net Income got reduced. On a first look 
the merger appeared to have destroyed value. However, it is important to have in consideration 
two aspects: the first is that both Optimus and ZON’s revenue growth rates have been 
decreasing in the last 3 years (the 5 year increasing growth rate is supported by the 2009 and 
2010 values), as well as the CAPEX and market share, which shows that both companies were 
slowing down and needed a new strategy to survive this very competitive market. On the other 
hand, NOS has been increasing the revenues, EBITDA and Net Income since the merger and 
the 400 thousand euros spent on capital expenditures show that the company is investing, 
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becoming more competitive and preparing for the international expansion, presenting a 
tendency for financial growth. Taking into account that the 3-year tendency of ZON and 
Optimus was not to grow, a study was performed to estimate the value of the two pre-merger 
companies combined on the long-run. Also, it is relevant to understand that the increase in 
SONAECOM profits and revenue derives from the fact that the group is investing in other 
activities with more potential to grow. So, 3 scenarios were assessed. The first scenario includes 
the estimates of pre-merger companies combined as if their performance only corresponds to 
90% of the estimated potential. A more likely scenario due to the fact that the companies did 
not increase their operations and were losing market share to the competitors. The same study 
was performed to an 80% and 70% comparison, all of them likely, depending on the time period 
and presence of innovative strategies. 
 
Table 5 - ZON and Optimus combined realistic estimations  
  70% 80% 90% 100% NOS 
Revenues 1120,04 1280,05 1440,06 1600,06 1444,3 
EBITDA 503,99 575,99 647,99 719,98 533,1 
CAPEX 154,42 176,48 198,54 220,60 408,3 
FCF 41,37 47,28 53,19 59,10 37,5 
Profit 154,43 176,49 198,55 220,62 82,7 
Values in Thousands of Euros 
(Source: NOS and Sonaecom financial reports) 
 
If the two ex-companies only assured 90% of the estimates for 2015, the revenues would be 
lower than NOS’ and the EBITDA would be lower on a 70% scenario. Following the Professor 
of Financial Management of IESE, Pablo Fernández (2006) statement about the importance of 
the FCF when compared to Net Income it is conclusive that despite the small difference on the 
FCF of NOS and the ex-companies combined, it is by far compensated with the difference on 
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the Capital Expenditure. Which means that NOS is presenting positive results even though the 
high investment, which will have positive consequences in the future. 
 
To continue this research an empirical analysis was performed. A method to assess the 
differences in the financial health of a firm can be obtained by comparing financial ratios. To 
be the most complete possible, 19 ratios were analyzed (liquidity, profitability, leverage, return 
on investment, market stock). The ratios refer to the average of the 5-year period results before 
the announcement of the merger (2008-2012) and the 3-year period after the merger (2013-
2015). 
 
Table 6 - Financial Ratios before and after the Merger 
  Pre Merger average Post merger average Better Performance 
Current Ratio 84,34% 52,89% ZON 
Acid Test Ratio 76,93% 49,23% ZON 
Cash Ratio 40,94% 4,01% ZON 
Working Capital -93,38 -412,40 ZON 
Return on Assets 2,13% 2,49% NOS 
Return on Equity 15,41% 6,94% ZON 
Gross Profit Margin 75,36% 73,05% ZON 
Net Profit Margin 4,02% 5,19% NOS 
Op. Profit Margin 11,40% 10,75% ZON 
Net Debt / EBITDA 213,17% 188,18% NOS 
Total Debts to Equity 622,91% 178,36% NOS 
Financial Leverage 722,93% 278,36% NOS 
Interest/Cover. Ratio 276,65% 280,55% NOS 
Debt Ratio 86,16% 64,07% NOS 
Long Term D/E 287,55% 70,44% NOS 
Ret. on Capital Employ 9,22% 7,08% ZON 
EBITDA/EV 34,25% 27,86% ZON 
Earning Per Share 0,1103 0,1431 NOS 
Earning Yield Ratio 0,0241 0,0198 ZON 
(Source: NOS and Sonaecom financial reports) 
 
In 10 ratios the company performed better before the merger and in 9 ratios performed better 
after. Although the outperformance of NOS on the leverage ratios and the underperformance 
on the liquidity ratios there is no evidence that the firm benefited as its whole form the merger. 
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Damodaran (2016) conducted a study on 65 telecommunications companies from the 5 
continents, concluding that the average return on equity of the industry is 12,21%, NOS was 
closer to this average before the merger. 
The results of the 3 years of NOS existence have changed dramatically, so it is important to 
compare the current value with the 3-year average to understand what direction are there ratios 
going. The results are presented on the following table: 
 
Table 7 - Financial Ratios in 2015 and 3-year average 
 Post merger average 2015 ratio Improving 
Current Ratio 52,89% 61,19% Yes 
Acid Test Ratio 49,23% 57,19% Yes 
Cash Ratio 4,01% 1,30% No 
Working Capital -412,4 -295,8 Yes 
Return on Assets 2,49% 2,78% Yes 
Return on Equity 6,94% 7,78% Yes 
Gross Profit Margin 73,05% 72,67% No 
Net Profit Margin 5,19% 5,73% Yes 
Op. Profit Margin 10,75% 10,85% Yes 
Net Debt / EBITDA 188,18% 196,66% No 
Total Debts to Equity 178,36% 179,88% No 
Financial Leverage 278,36% 279,88% No 
Interest Coverage Ratio 280,55% 421,29% Yes 
Debt Ratio 64,07% 64,27% No 
Long Term D/E 70,44% 84,47% No 
Ret. on Capital Empl 7,08% 6,79% No 
EBITDA/EV 27,86% 26,00% No 
Earning Per Share 0,1431 0,1605 Yes 
Earning Yield Ratio 0,0198 0,0204 Yes 
(Source: NOS and Sonaecom financial reports) 
 
Again, 10 ratios are moving towards a healthier value while 9 are not, so no conclusion can be 
made. 
Finally, to complete this part of the research, it is required a relative valuation of NOS. For that, 
a sample of 15 big European and American telecom firms with a similar stock performance as 
NOS were analyzed. The stock price movement is an important filter for this part of the research 
as the 15 companies are on a similar stage as NOS, attempting to grow on a consolidated market. 
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The 8 eight valuation multiples directly presented in Bloomberg terminal were observed. In 
order to make a more reliable comparison, 95% confidence intervals were calculated for the 
time periods before and after the merger and compared to the multiples’ values of ZON and 
NOS to understand whether they lay on the confidence interval or not and if not, if they are 
above of below the interval. 
 
Table 8 – Multiple comparison before and after the merger 








to CI Overall 
P/E 24,07 16,36 Higher 60,80 24,74 Higher Same 
P/Book 3,97 2,99 Inside 3,26 4,23 Inside Same 
P/Cash Flow 3,46 4,68 Lower 5,25 5,83 Inside Better 
P/FCF 8,57 15,26 Inside 10,23 20,07 Lower Worse 
EV/Sales 2,03 1,91 Inside 2,81 2,17 Higher Better 
EV/EBITDA 5,53 6,56 Lower 7,75 8,04 Inside Better 
Div. Yield 5,67 5,02 Inside 4,72 4,06 Inside Same 
EV/EBIT 18,55 25,31 Inside 25,65 20,49 Inside Same 
(Source: Bloomberg) 
 
From the 8 multiples, 6 have increased after the merger. Before the merger, 2 multiples were 
lower than the average and 1 was higher (for a 95% confidence level). On the other hand, there 
is significant evidence that after the merger, 2 multiples were higher than the average and 1 was 
lower. On the overall, from the 8 multiples observed with a 95% confidence level, it could be 
concluded that 3 got better after the merger, 1 got worse and 4 remained the same which means 
that the merger had a positive impact in NOS when compared to the industry. 
Market Share 
 
The 3 telecom companies that operate in Portugal are competing for the 10 million Portuguese 
population. Since the ZON/Optimus merger, none of the the telecom companies initiated 
relevant international expansion strategies (except from Vodafone Group and Altice but that is 
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irrelevant for this analysis), so the more direct way to increase revenues is to conquer market 
share to the competitors. If the market shares of the different services are increasing, it is a good 
sign that the merger is having a positive impact on the firm market power. In the Anacom 
(Communications National Authority) website is presented data from the market shares since 
the 3rd trimester of 2014 until de last of 2015. Based on that, an estimation was made for the 
following two trimesters to understand the tendency. 
 





According to the graph, most of the services are increasing its market share. Double play and 
triple play are losing market share which is being compensated with the increase in the 
quadruple and quintuple play. The only evident decline is on the paid TV service, which has 
been declining for ZON Multimedia since the deregulation of the market and the entrance of 




Investment Banks Recommendations 
 
Listed companies very often have their stocks analyzed by financial experts who make 
recommendations on the stocks, based on their future value and performance. As banks use 
different names for each category, the similar ones are grouped together using numbers, with 
the following connotation: 
1 – Buy, Strong Buy, Outperform, Overweight 
2 - Neutral, Equal weight, Hold 
3 – Sell, Underperform, Underweight 
 
Table 10 - Investment Banks' Recommendations 
Recommendation Institution 
1 Berenberg, Intermoney Valores S.V., HSBC, Caixa BI, Fidentiis, BPI, 
BBVA, RBC, Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse 
2 Santander, Jefferies, Barclays Capital, Haitong, Citigroup, UBS, JP 
Morgan, Goldman Sachs, New Street Research 
3 None 
(Source: NOS institutional website) 
 
This table shows the latest recommendation from some of the biggest banks in the world. 
Considering that none of the Investment banks analyzed recommend selling, it could be 
assumed that the analysts have a generalized positive opinion on the future performance of 
NOS’ stock. Investment banks agree that NOS will grow and that the stock increase is 







In what concerns the dividend policy, telecommunications companies present more stable and 
predictable results, they are less vulnerable to the overall market volatility and don’t invest as 
much of the profits compared to companies in other sectors. For this reason, they can support 
bigger payout ratios than cyclical firms. 
PT Multimedia (prior ZON Multimedia) was spun-off during the Sonaecom takeover attempt 
on PT Comunicações. During this period, the dividend policy was aggressive and for this 
research the policy will only be analyzed since after the attempt, when ZON was created. 
The dividends paid are showed on the following table. 
 
Table 11 - Dividends in each year 
Year Net income (Millions of Euros) Earnings per Share Dividend Payout Ratio 
2008 47,9 0,16€ 0,16€ 103% 
2009 44,0 0,14€ 0,16€ 112% 
2010 35,4 0,11€ 0,16€ 140% 
2011 34,2 0,11€ 0,16€ 145% 
2012 36,0 0,12€ 0,12€ 103% 
2013 63,4 0,12€ 0,12€ 97% 
2014 74,7 0,15€ 0,14€ 97% 
2015 82,7 0,17€ 0,16€ 96,6% 
(Source: NOS institutional website) 
 
If one had invested 100€ in NOS 4 years before the announcement and reinvested the dividends 
in more stocks, one would have 290€ today. Besides that, if the 100€ were invested when the 
merger announcement was made, today the stocks would be worth 271,5€. 
Damodaran (2016) conducted a study on 65 telecommunications companies from the 5 
continents, concluding that the average payout ratio was 124,64% (Jan 2016), the 3rd highest 
after Real Estate (449,37%) and Oil/Gas Distribution (225, 73%). In the case of NOS, the 
almost 100% payout ratio is sustainable because the dividends from the shares owned by the 
company (Zopt, 50,01%) will be forwarded to the transited results. This way, the payout ratio 
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in the next year can be higher than 100%. According to Gaughan (2011), most deals utilize a 
third subsidiary corporation that is created to facilitate the acquisition. In this case, the third 




The aim of the research was to analyze the profitability of ZON/Optimus merger for the 
shareholders. The merger was consolidated in August 2013 so the data available from then until 
now can be used to determine the short term success.  
 Comparing the stock price movement with the national and international paradigm, the 
merger appears to have achieved the objective, as NOS’ stock was the 3rd best performer 
in the PSI 20 and above the average of the biggest, established players in the telecom 
industry and also over performed its investors’ performance.  
 When comparing NOS financial statements with the predictions of ZON and Optimus 
for the past 3 years, NOS appears to be worth less due to the lower profits and lower 
FCF however, its growing revenues and profits, aligned with a much bigger CAPEX 
value show that NOS is on a different stage than the ZON and Optimus estimations. 
NOS is consolidating its position in the market and preparing for international 
expansion while ZON and Optimus showed a tendency to underperform. 
 From the 19 financial ratios analyzed (liquidity ratios, profitability ratios, solvency 
ratios, return on investment ratio and market stock ratios) 10 were more favorable before 
the merger and 9 were after, so no conclusion could be made. 
 The 3-year average of the 19 ratios was compared with the latest year value (2015) to 
analyze the evolution of the ratios. Again, no conclusion could be made. 
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 Through the multiples valuation, it was concluded that NOS is now performing better 
than its peers than before the merger. From the 8 multiples analyzed, 3 got better and 
only 1 got worse. 
 Despite the decline of the market shares of the double play and triple play services, 
which are compensated with the increase the quadruple play and quintuple play, NOS 
is facing a general increase in market share and the tendency is also positive. With 
exception to the paid TV which has been declining since the deregulation of the market 
 From the 20 banks observed, 10 recommended holding the stock while 10 
recommended buying NOS stocks, with none recommending to sell or expecting an 
underperformance. 
 If the profit from dividends were reinvested in more stocks at the time they were paid, 
for each 100€ invested in ZON 4 years before the merger, the investor would now have 
290€ and for each 100€ invested when the merger was announced, the current value of 
the stocks would be 271,5€. There is clear evidence that the merger added value to the 
shareholders. 
 
On the overall, regarding all topics mentioned above, there is significant evidence that the 
merger added value to the shareholders. 
As mentioned before, 2 years is the period after which is possible to analyze the impact of a 
merger. Since the results of the 2 complete years of operations were disclosed on March of 
2016, this research was the first research ever made about this topic so it is an important 
contribution to the world of business.  
In what concerns the body of knowledge, this research presents several methods to analyze a 




Analyze the consumer perspective to the merger, understand if NOS brand image had a positive 
impact on the consumers. Study the movement of the telecom prices and compare it with the 
period before the merger. With this could be concluded that the market became more 
competitive. Interviews can be performed to get a general opinion. Besides that, according to 
the biggest shareholder, Isabel dos Santos (2013), the power of the new company and the multi 
market vision of its shareholders will open doors for expansion to other countries. This means 
that despite the success that NOS is having in Portugal, it is expected to be even bigger after 
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